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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAWN DAVID LARSON, 
Defendant. 
CASENO.20060874-CA j 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant, SHAWN DAVID LARSON, hereby submits this Reply Brief in 
response to the State's arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State argues Mr. Larson failed to preserve several issues and they are 
not properly before this Court. The State's argument is without merit. Mr. Larson 
raises only two issues in his appeal: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to dismiss; and (2) that Mr. Larson's trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to timely file a motion to dismiss and for failing to timely 
appear at the preliminary hearing scheduled on August 27, 2003. Both of these 
claims and all facts fairly encompassed within them were preserved below and are 
properly before this Court. 
The State also argues the record supports the trial court's denial of Mr. 
Larson's motion to dismiss. However, while the State misconstrues much of Mr. 
Larson's argument, the State fails to dispute the fact that the prosecution failed to 
meet its affirmative obligation under the controlling statute to bring Mr. Larson's 
notice of disposition to the court's attention and to establish good cause for the 
numerous delays in open court. Failure to dispute these facts concedes them. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALL OF MR. LARSON'S CLAIMS WERE PRESERVED AND 
ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
A. The issues raised in Mr. Larson's appeal were preserved below and 
are properly before this Court. 
Mr. Larson argued in his opening brief the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss; and in a subsection of that 
argument, Mr. Larson argued it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny 
his motion when it was clear from the record that the State failed to meet its 
burden of compliance. BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt") at 23-27. Mr. Larson 
then noted that while he would normally have the "burden [on appeal] of 
demonstrating that the trial court's factual findings [that the State met its burden of 
compliance] are clearly erroneous, the trial court made no factual findings [in that 
regard]." Br. Appt. at 27. 
The State indicates it has difficulty understanding this argument. BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE ("Br. Appee.") at 20. The State then argues Mr. Larson failed to 
preserve the issue of the trial court's failure to make factual findings regarding the 
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prosecutor's compliance with her affirmative obligation below because he "never 
asked the trial court to make findings concerning whether the prosecutor 
adequately fulfilled her burdens under the UMDDA." Br. Appee. at 21. 
This argument misses the mark and further ignores the fact that Mr. Larson 
is not required to request additional findings about issues Mr. Larson raised in his 
motion that the court chose not to address in its ruling. Mr. Larson does not and 
has not argued the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to make factual 
findings regarding the prosecutor's compliance with her affirmative duty. That 
affirmative duty exists outside of any findings the trial court may or may not have 
made. Mr. Larson argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion, particularly without acknowledging the prosecutor's affirmative 
obligation or her repeated failures to comply with that statutory duty. Br. Appt. at 
23-27. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law1 simply ignore the 
fact that the prosecutor had an affirmative obligation. 
Notably, the State does not argue the prosecutor did not have an affirmative 
obligation to comply with the statute. However, in a roundabout way, the State 
seems to treat this issue and other issues related to Mr. Larson's notice of 
disposition as if they were being raised for the first time on appeal. The State's 
1
 Given that the decision wherein these findings and conclusions are made is the 
ruling Mr. Larson is appealing from, the State's argument that Mr. Larson failed to 
preserve the issue of the trial court's failure to make certain findings within that 
decision that is being appealed from because he did not raise the lack of findings 
after the decision was entered is not even logical. 
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argument is misleading, somewhat confusing, and unsupported by either the facts 
or the law. 
In a cursory argument lacking any citations to the record including Mr. 
Larson's motion to dismiss, the State claims Mr. Larson failed to preserve the 
fictitious claim that the district court failed to make findings regarding the 
prosecutor's compliance or lack thereof with the speedy trial statute. Br. Appee. at 
20-21. The State argues, "Defendant's claim fails because he did not raise it, let 
alone expressly preserve it, below." Br. Appee. at 20. 
Again, while this is not the issue raised by Mr. Larson, he did raise the 
claim that the prosecutor failed to comply with her affirmative duty. Br. Appt. at 
26-7. Thus, not only was this issue was preserved for appeal in Mr. Larson's 
motion to dismiss, the State fails to offer any rebuttal to that claim and thereby 
concedes the point. 
Further, to the extent the State's argument might be construed as a claim 
that Mr. Larson did not preserve the issue of the prosecutor's affirmative duty 
below, the record flatly contradicts the State's assertion. Mr. Larson's motion 
expressly raised the issue and the undisputed purpose of Mr. Larson's Sery plea 
was to preserve Mr. Larson's right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion 
to dismiss. R340 (336-45); R420:3-4. This includes all of the issues raised in Mr. 
Larson's motion and at the evidentiary hearing on the motion when Mr. Larson's 
previous trial counsel testified about the State's failure to provide him with the 
crime lab report. R416:74, 76-7. Of course, Mr. Larson's claim also encompasses 
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the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the trial court's ruling he is 
appealing from. It includes all of the record facts that are relevant to the issue that 
were preserved below, which facts are fairly encompassed within Mr. Larson's 
motion and are not new issues as the State claims. See, Br. Appee. at 32 (arguing 
Mr. Larson's coerced waivers were not preserved even though the trial court 
participated in those discussions and presumably considered them in its ruling); 34 
(arguing State's failure to timely provide DNA evidence to defense was not 
preserved notwithstanding relevant testimonial evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing on the motion and thus presumably considered in the trial 
court's ruling). 
Mr. Larson's memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss includes 
the following language relative to the several hearings that were conducted before 
the court when the matter was repeatedly continued: 
Nowhere in the hearing transcript of June 10, 2003, is there a waiver from 
SHAWN DAVID LARSON, nor is there any finding that there is "good 
cause" to continue the matter by the court. Note also that there is no 
mention by the prosecution of the pending request for disposition. More 
importantly it is a continuance which is more at the convenience of the 
prosecution because of the numerous witnesses and the court rather than the 
defendant. ... 
... [At a subsequent hearing] no colloquy is held with the defendant, the 
defendant does not waive on the record nor does the court make a finding 
of "good cause" for the delay. 
... [At a subsequent hearing] No discussion was conducted with defendant, 
waiver sought on the record nor finding of "good cause" for the delay 
mentioned. To this point it has been 170 days since defendant filed his 
request for disposition. ... 
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R232-33; Br. Appt., Addendum C at 3-4). Mr. Larson then argued as follows: 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that section 77-29-1 places the burden 
of compliance on the prosecutor. [Citations omitted]. As the Court 
explained, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's 
matter heard within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to 
notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good 
faith effort to comply with the statute." [Citation omitted]. The Utah 
Appellate Court has also acknowledged that it is a prosecutor's duty to 
ensure that the defendant is brought to trial within 120 days after filing a 
notice. ... Ultimately, the trial court may find good cause based upon its 
underlying findings of fact with regard to the reason for the delay [then 
stating possible bases for finding "good cause"]. [Citations omitted]. 
Id. at 234 (Br. Appt., Addendum C at 5-6). 
The State's argument that Mr. Larson failed to preserve his "claim that the 
trial court's ruling was erroneous as a matter of law" is misleading because, after 
that general heading, the State focuses its preservation argument on the trial 
court's failure to make findings about the prosecutor's affirmative duty, which is 
not the issue Mr. Larson raised. Therefore, the State's argument misconstrues the 
real issue and attempts to circumvent the fact that the prosecution in this case 
simply ignored and thus failed to meet its affirmative obligation to ensure Mr. 
Larson was brought to trial within 120 days. As such, the State's argument has no 
merit. 
Moreover, the State does not claim that Mr. Larson failed to preserve the 
real issue, which is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. 
Larson's motion to dismiss. 
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B, The State's claim that the record supports the trial court's ruling 
fails. 
The State asserts Mr. Larson's claims regarding the trial court's abuse of 
discretion rely "heavily on misrepresentations of the record[.]" Br. Appee. at 22. 
This assertion is misleading because it seems to suggest Mr. Larson has 
deliberately attempted to mislead this Court by citing the record facts in a 
disingenuous manner. This assertion is not true, as a review of Appellant's 
opening brief reveals. Mr. Larson carefully cited and quoted the record and left 
out no facts, favorable or unfavorable to his position, that are relevant to his 
claims. In short, Mr. Larson has made no misrepresentations and the State's 
contrary claim is misleading and objectionable. 
Moreover, while the State spends several pages (see Br. Appee. at 24-37) 
discussing its theories about which party was responsible for the delays in this 
case, the State's argument completely disregards the undisputed fact that for 
several months after Mr. Larson filed his notice of disposition, the prosecutor 
never brought the notice to the trial court's attention, the prosecutor failed to meet 
her affirmative obligation to ensure good cause was shown in open court and to 
bring this matter to trial, and the trial court never made a showing of good cause 
for delay in open court. Mr. Larson's request for disposition was simply ignored 
for several months after he filed it. Therefore, the State's argument disregards the 
plain language of the controlling statute and the case law which the State also 
acknowledges as controlling. See, e.g., State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, 
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1[15, 71 P.3d 184 (when a matter is continued the prosecution "has an affirmative 
obligation to ensure that good cause is shown in open court... [and] an affirmative 
duty to request that the trial court make its determination of good cause in open 
court to ask the court to create a record in support of its good cause 
determination.") (cited and quoted in Br. Appee. at 17). 
In short, in all of the State's presentation of the facts, not once does the 
State claim that the prosecutor met her affirmative obligation to ensure that good 
cause for delay was shown in open court during the first several months after Mr. 
Larson filed his notice of disposition. Therefore, it is undisputed that the 
prosecutor failed to meet her affirmative obligation. This conceded fact should be 
dispositive. 
Further, the State misstates Mr. Larson's factual argument in a manner that 
is misleading. In his opening brief, Mr. Larson argued, "During the first 120 days 
after Mr. Larson filed his notice for disposition, the matter was delayed because 
the State sought a stipulation to continue the preliminary hearing and then 
passively waited for the federal government to bring charges against Mr. Larson." 
Br. Appt. at 26 (emphasis added). This is a true and accurate statement that is 
supported by the record. R409:l; R24-5; R26-9. However, in its brief, the State 
misquotes this argument as follows: "According to defendant, the record does not 
support these rulings 'because the State sought stipulation[s]' to continue the 
hearings 'and then passively waited for the federal government to bring charges 
against Mr. Larson.'" Br. Appee. at 26. Thus the State omitted the essential 
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clarifier, "a", and changed the singular "stipulation" to its plural form and thereby 
changed both the entire meaning and the intent of Mr. Larson's statement. 
Mr. Larson's focus in his Statement of Facts was upon the fact that the 
prosecution never brought his notice to the trial court's attention and never 
requested the court to make a finding of good cause for delay. Br. Appt. at 7-22. 
He did not downplay any instance when his own counsel sought for or stipulated 
to a continuance. He also quoted verbatim his recorded conversations with the 
trial court when it was clear he did not want to waive his right to a speedy trial yet 
felt compelled to do so. Id. Mr. Larson also candidly set forth his own counsel's 
stipulations to and requests for various continuances. Id. Other than the first 
request in June 2003, which Mr. Larson explained his counsel stipulated to, Mr. 
Larson never claimed "that the State was the sole party seeking these 
continuances." Br. Appee. at 26. Therefore, the State's recitation of Mr. Larson's 
factual claims is misleading. 
Moreover, contrary to the State's argument, prolonging prosecution until 
the federal government decides whether or not to indict a defendant is not good 
cause for delaying a state case. Br. Appee. at 27-8. The State cites no legal 
authority to support this claim. Thus, it is inadequately briefed and this Court 
should refuse to consider it. State v. Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2003). 
The State also argues Mr. Larson's claim that an attorney cannot waive his 
client's constitutional rights, particularly over his client's objection, is 
inadequately briefed. Br. Appee. at 28. This argument is interesting. The fact 
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that constitutional rights belong solely to the defendant is so fundamental that it is 
self-evident in the large body of law that relates in any manner to the rights of the 
accused. For example, Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
designed to ensure that a defendant, not his attorney, knowingly and voluntarily 
waives all of his constitutional rights before entering a plea. See also, State v. 
TarnawieckU 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222 (vacating the defendant's 
convictions because the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of her right to 
a speedy trial was plain error). Notably, the State has presented no legal authority 
to support its implied claim that an attorney's failure to appear may constitute a 
waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy trial, particularly when the defendant 
objects to the waiver on the record. 
Further, the State's argument that "defendant's claim fails because the trial 
court's ruling concerning the August 27, 2003 continuance was not based on 
defense counsel's waiver of defendant's IJMDDA rights" (Br. Appee. at 29) is an 
attempt to make a distinction without a difference. This hearing was only one 
week prior to the expiration of the 120 days and there is no evidence to suggest 
that without this delay, this case would have been brought to trial within the 120-
day period. Moreover, the next hearing was not scheduled until October 2003, 
several days after the initial 120-day period. R43-5; R411. 
The remainder of the State's factual allegations and legal arguments set 
forth in pages 30-37 are already addressed in Mr. Larson's opening brief. 
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II. MR. LARSON'S CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The State asks this Court to disregard Mr. Larson's claim for 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, alleging that claim was not preserved below. Br. 
Appee. at 37. This argument fails for at least three reasons. 
First, trial counsel's ineffectiveness was preserved at the evidentiary 
hearing on Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss. R416. Mr. Larson testified he had 
repeatedly asked Mr. O'Connell to file a motion to dismiss, but Mr. O'Connell 
failed to do so. R416:15-16. Mr. Larson testified Mr. O'Connell told him there 
were no legal grounds for the motion. R416:16, 20, 25-6, 71-2. Mr. O'Connell 
testified that while he did not believe there were any legal grounds to file the 
motion, he "didn't rule it out at that point either." R416:72. When Mr. Larson 
fired Mr. O'Connell, Mr. O'Connell testified he believed Mr. Larson had a "really 
good appeal issue" on the 120-day disposition, yet Mr. O'Connell never filed a 
motion to dismiss on that issue. R416:84-5, 87. Mr. O'Connell's performance 
was clearly a key issue at the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, was heard and 
considered by the trial court in its ruling and preserved by Mr. Larson's Sery plea. 
Second, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Court Order, the 
trial court found the preliminary hearing scheduled on August 27, 2003 was 
continued because Mr. Larson's counsel failed to appear. R239. The court then 
concluded, "There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from August 
27,2003 to October 8, 2003 based upon defense counsel's failure to appear. Such 
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delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant." R240. This is the ruling Mr. 
Larson is appealing from pursuant to his Sery plea. Also, the trial court's previous 
finding that Mr. O'Connell's conduct in failing to appear "impeded the 
administration of justice [and] . . . his client's right to a speedy trial" (R37) not 
only preserved the issue, it established trial counsel's ineffective assistance and the 
resulting prejudice to Mr. Larson. 
Finally, even though Mr. Larson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
not being raised for the first time here, it is well established that a claim for 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel may be considered for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2005 UT 25, TJ6 (an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law). Mr. Larson's 
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appear at the preliminary 
hearing and for failing to file a motion to dismiss is an issue that was raised and 
considered by the trial court below and is fairly encompassed within Mr. Larson's 
claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Larson respectfully requests this Court to find (1) that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial 
statute; and (2) that Mr. Larson's trial counsel rendered deficient performance that 
prejudiced Mr. Larson. 
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th Respectfully submitted this 12 day of June, 2008. 
Jenifer j£7Gowans 
Attorney for Mr. Larson 
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